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MERGERS- THE ACCOUNTANT AS A
CREATIVE ARTIST
LEE J. SEIDLER*
In recent years, a number of accounting publications have chronicled
the "abuses" under the "pooling of interest" treatment. These include
Arthur Wyatt's study,1 which concluded with a suggestion for "fair value
poolings," a proposal that sent chills to the hearts of merger-oriented
corporations. Abraham Briloff has condemned pooling with evangelical
fervor in several financial publications, while the recent AICPA study, ARS
No. 10,2 used a dinosaur-age interpretation of accounting theory to suggest
that accountants give up on the entire problem. A timorous minority of
accounting commentators have tried to defend the pooling treatment.
This clamor had virtually no effect on the actual practices of account-
ants, and in blissful disregard of their critics, accountants continued to
treat the vast majority of acquisitions and mergers as "poolings."
STARTING AT THE BEGINNING
Most discussions of pooling and purchase accounting seem to assume
that readers clearly understand the mechanics involved in the transactions.
Experience suggests, however, that a brief, basic review at this point may
make the remaining discussions somewhat more useful.
For purposes of this illustration, assume two companies, A and B, whose
condensed balance sheets are given in Exhibit 1. A and B arrange a merger.
EXHIBIT I
A B
Assets $4,000 $2,000
Liabilities 2,000 1,000
Capitala 2.000 1,000
4,000 2,000
a Includes capital stock, paid-in surplus and retained earnings.
The purchase price of all the shares of B from the B shareholders will be
$2,000, in terms of A stock at market value. Since B has a net book value
(or capital) of $1,000, A is paying for $1,000 excess of cost over book value -
goodwill. A will issue additional shares to effect the merger.
* Professor of Accounting, New York University Graduate School of Business Adminis-
tration. C.P.A.; A.B., Columbia College, 1956; M.S., Columbia University, 1957; Ph.D.,
Columbia University, 1966. Portions of this paper have previously appeared as articles in
the ERA Accounting Review, a private publication of Equity Research Associates.
1 Wyatt, A Critical Study of Accounting for Business Combinations, ARS No. 5 (1963).
Wyatt left the AICPA immediately after ARS No. 5 was released.
2 Catlett & Olson, Accounting for Goodwill, ARS No. 10 (1968). The two authors are
partners of the accounting firm of Arthur Andersen & Co.
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Purchase Accounting
Under purchase accounting, A would record an investment in B at its
cost, $2,000, and record the issuance of the new shares at their fair market
value, $2,000. In the instant prior to the merger, A's balance sheet would
appear as illustrated in Exhibit 11.
EXHIBIT II
A
Assets $4,000
Investment in B 2,000
6,000
Liabilities 2,000
Capital 4,000
6,000
B's balance sheet remains unchanged. The merger, that is, the combination
of A and B into one entity, AB, is accomplished by adding B's net assets of
$1,000 ($2,000 of assets less $1,000 of liabilities) to A's net assets. The invest-
ment in B of $2,000 is netted against B's capital account and the $1,000
difference representing the excess A paid over B's book value is recorded as
goodwill (see Exhibit III).
EXHIBIT III
Elimination
A B B Capital AB
Assets $4,000 + $2,000 = $6,000
Investment in B 2,000 (1,000) - 1,000 Goodwill
6,000 2,000 7,000
Liabilities 2,000 + 1,000 = 3,000
Capital 4,000 + 1,000 (1,000) - 4,000
6,000 2,000 7,000
Pooling Accounting
Despite the complexities that the pooling of interest seems to produce,
accounting for a pooling is actually simpler than under the purchase assump-
tion. All that is done is to add the two balance sheets as they appeared
before the merger. There are no eliminations or changes in values; it is just
as if the pages of the general ledger of B have been interleaved with those
of A (see Exhibit IV).
ExHinrr IV
A B AB Pooled
Assets $4,000 + $2,000 = $6,000
Liabilities 2,000 + 1,000 3,000
Capital 2,000 + 1,000 = 3,000
4,000 + 2,000 = 6,000
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The perceptive reader may now ask what has happened to the $2,000
market value of the A stock issued to pay the B shareholders. A started
with $2,000 of capital and issued $2,000 worth of additional shares, which
suggests a total capital of $4,000. The combined capital of AB Pooled is
only $3,000. The answer is simple, so simple that it often tends to be con-
fusing. The stock issued to the B shareholders is valued precisely at the
net book value of B, $1,000 in this case. The market value of the shares
issued, the purchase price paid to the B shareholders, is completely ignored.
The failure under the pooling of interest to record the market value of
the consideration given in an acquisition, points out the fundamental reason
why the pooling is available only when stock is given as payment for the
shares acquired. While there is no difficulty in arbitrarily stating the shares
given at some figure other than their value (certainly this has been done
often enough in the past), it is hard to see how even the most ingenious
bookkeeper could reduce the $2,000 paid by A, if it were paid in cash, to only
$1,000. Thus, the pooling treatment is limited to stock-for-stock acquisitions,
and purchase is used for cash transactions.8 As noted below, however, in-
genious accountants have been able to circumvent this restriction, and allow
considerable cash to be involved by the implausible concept of part-pooling,
part-purchase.
To ignore the market value of the shares given to B shareholders has an
attraction. The surviving company under the pooling, AB Pooled, shows
exactly the same book values as the constituent companies did before the
merger. If all things remain equal, AB Pooled will show a profit exactly
equal to the profit earned by the two companies prior to the merger. The
company that treated the merger as a purchase, AB, shows $1,000 more of
assets. If this goodwill has to be amortized, then AB, all other things being
equal, will have a lower profit than A and B had before the merger. Under
purchase accounting, if the management does nothing after the merger, but
has to amortize the goodwill, it will appear as if the merger has resulted in a
less successful operation. The amortization is not tax deductible, which
makes it doubly unattractive. Thus, it is not difficult to predict which type of
accounting the management will prefer.
Other "Benefits" of the Pooling
In many cases goodwill is no longer amortized. Even if amortization is
omitted, pooling has other attractions. Assume that in the previous
example, A has been earning $200 while B consistently earns $100; each
shows a 10 percent rate of return on book equity. By giving $2,000 worth of
stock to purchase B's $100 of earnings, A obtained only a 5 percent return
on the investment. Purchase accounting clearly reflects this situation, since
AB will earn $300 (assuming no amortization of goodwill) on a book equity
of $4,000, an average rate of 7.5 percent.
3 Purchase accounting, however, can also be used in stock-for-stock acquisitions.
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AB Pooled will also earn $300, but it shows a book equity of only
$3,000 and thus maintains the 10 percent pre-acquisition rate. That A share-
holders made an investment returning 5 percent is totally obscured. If AB
Pooled were now to give $10,000 (market value) of stock to acquire a com-
pany C, which had an identical balance sheet to company B, ABC Pooled
would still show a return on book equity of 10 percent, even though the new
investment yielded only 1 percent.
AB Pooled instead finds a company D, which is earning $200 on a book
equity of only $1,000, a 20 percent return. If the going multiple were 10, A
would have to pay $2,000 for D, an investment returning 10 percent. How-
ever, adding D's earnings to AB Pooled would provide a total of $500 of
earnings on a total book equity of $4,000, raising ABD Pooled to a rate of
return on equity of 12.5 percent. That is a bit like printing money.
A LITTLE HISTORY
The pooling treatment appears a little more logical if its historical
background is considered. It apparently was first used in some of the mergers
effected in the 1920's, when groups that owned several companies combined
them into one unit. Thus, if the same group of shareholders owned A and B
corporation, it did not seem logical that a merger should be effected under
the classical assumption that one was buying out the other. Instead, the
books of the two companies were merely added together. This treatment
had the additional advantage at that time, when the ability to pay dividends
was of greater significance, of preserving the earned surplus of both com-
panies. One of the first uses of the term "pooling of interests" was in the
1940's, in an FPC ruling which denied two utilities the right to revalue their
assets (upward) when the interests of the same group of stockholders were
combined.4 The companies were required to retain their original book
values.
The AICPA discussed the matter during the late 1940's and issued
Accounting Research Bulletin No. 40 (ARB No. 40) in 1950.5 ARB No. 40
gave official sanction to the broadening of the idea of pooling the interests
of one group of shareholders to the concept of continuing the ownership of
two different groups of shareholders in one surviving entity. Clearly, a stock-
for-stock exchange fitted these circumstances. ARB No. 40 vaguely suggested
that the constituent companies should be of similar size, but did not define
relative size in any objective manner.
In January 1957, the AICPA issued ARB No. 48,6 which was somewhat
more specific about the conditions under which a pooling could be under-
taken. While ARB No. 40 had been rather noncommittal, ARB No. 48
clearly indicated the "forbidden fruit" nature of the pooling. That is, by
4 In re Montana Power Co., 4 F.P.C. 213, 234 (1945).
5AICPA, Business Combinations, ARB No. 40 (1950).
6 AICPA, Business Combinations, ARB No. 48 (1957).
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this time it was evident that in most cases companies wanted to use pooling
rather than the purchase treatment, and ARB No. 48 attempted to stem
the tide. Therefore, it stipulated requirements of similar size, continuity of
ownership, continuity of management and similarity of business. The
gradual erosion of these requirements provides a classic proof of a corollary
to Gresham's Law, namely, that accounting principles which produce higher
income tend to drive out those that produce lower income.
The Shrinking Size Criterion
ARB No. 48 stipulated that the smaller of two companies in a pooling
should constitute at least 5 percent of the total entity; otherwise, purchase
accounting should be used.
In March 1968, Teledyne, Inc. merged with Electronic Instrumenta-
tion Inc. and accounted for the merger as a pooling of interests. The owners
of Electronic received 769 shares of Teledyne stock in exchange for all the
outstanding stock of their company, giving them an interest in the "com-
bined enterprise" of 0.0086 percent. The original Teledyne shareholders
retained 99.9914 percent control, a percentage somewhat higher than the
purity attributed to a popular soap.
ARB No. 48's criterion was based, of course, on the fundamental
premise that for two companies to "pool their interests," they had to have
some relative similarity in size. The original standard, that the smaller of
the companies had to be at least 5 percent of the total entity, seemed to
be a generous interpretation of the basic concept - but it was not generous
enough.
The 5 percent limitation held for only a short period after ARB No. 48
was released. Some bright accountant, who remains anonymous, concluded
that there was no significant difference between pooling a company that con-
stituted 5.00 percent of the combined company and one that cdnstituted
4.99 percent, and did so. It took less time for the next accountant to decide
that 4.98 percent was not significantly different from 4.99 percent, and the
salami slicing started. The 2 percent mark seems to have been a barrier
for a short while, but it was breached around 1959, and all pretense at
worrying about size then ended. The Teledyne pooling, heretofore described,
is somewhat smaller than usual, but it is doubtful that it is a record.
The Retroactive Pooling
The release of ARB No. 48, with its specific numerical criterion for a
pooling, opened a chapter in accounting that many accounting theorists
would rather forget. The debacle started when ARB No. 48 cited a standard
for poolings, 5 percent, which was considerably lower than the standard be-
ing allowed by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) at that time.
Almost immediately thereafter, several companies, among them FMC Corpo-
ration (then Food Machinery and Chemical Corporation) and Philip Morris,
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initiated some unique and innovative accounting changes. FMC had ac-
quired Buffalo Electro Chemical Corporation in 1952 and treated the acqui-
sition, in which the Buffalo shareholders received a 10.5 percent interest in
the combined company, as a purchase. Similarly, Philip Morris had treated
its 1954 exchange of shares with Benson and Hedges, in which the latter
received a 15.4 percent interest, as a purchase. The FMC purchase treatment
had resulted in recording $8.2 million of intangibles out of a total purchase
price of $13.6 million; Philip Morris had recorded $14 million of the total
acquisition price of $21 million as goodwill.
In January 1957, both corporations, citing the changed standards in
ARB No. 48, "retroactively" reflected the transactions as poolings of interest.
This was accomplished essentially by reversing the original recording as a
purchase and reentering the transactions as poolings; $22.2 million of
goodwill was wiped out.
These early retroactive poolings set the stage for even greater aberra-
tions. As the 5 percent criterion of ARB No. 48 gradually fell, companies
which had initially observed the limitation began to feel discriminated
against. The retroactive pooling provided perfect justification for their
contention that "had we known then what we know now, we would have
pooled." In July 1959, W.R. Grace acquired Hatco Chemical (2.6 percent)
for $5.4 million and treated it as a purchase. In December 1960, Grace
retroactively pooled Hatco, eliminating $3.9 million of goodwill which was
being amortized, and according to a calculation by Professor A. N. Mosich,
raised income by $443 thousand.7 The years 1960 and 1961 saw a rash of
retroactive poolings as more companies reconsidered their previous account-
ing each time a new lower percentage pooling was announced. The practice
was utilized less frequently in 1962, when today's "mini-poolings" became
standard and only a few companies, which had presumably been somewhat
slower on the uptake, remained to try these reversals.
(Almost) Anything Goes
While retroactive pooling has now become merely an embarrassing
chapter in accounting history, its effects remain with us. The acceptance of
the concept by the SEC and reputable accounting firms clearly established
a precedent that accounting for business combinations would be a series of
attempts to find even the most far-fetched rationalizations for the pooling
treatment - except, of course, when negative goodwill was involved -
under almost any merger situation other than a straight cash purchase.
In the past few years, as the merger boom accelerated, the pooling of
interests has been stretched to a point where it bears virtually no resem-
blance to the original concept of the merger of two jointly owned enter-
prises. It has now been accommodated to the demands of mergers which
are consummated for both stock and cash, where debt and preferred stock
7 See Mosich, Retroactive Poolings in Corporate Mergers, 41 J. Bus. 352, 359 (1968).
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are given instead of common shares, where merging shareholders sell out
large portions of their holding immediately, and even where only por-
tions of businesses are merged. The original attraction of the pooling in
avoiding the recognition of goodwill still remains, but it has been supple-
mented by techniques that allow other improvements in the profit picture.
Having now presented the basic principles of pooling of interest accounting,
we will provide the means for understanding the accounting results of the
more complex poolings which have become increasingly common in the
past few years.
Man Does Not Live by Stock Alone
We noted above that the pooling of interest treatment, as originally
rationalized, was to apply to situations where shareholders of companies
of relatively comparable size joined forces, that is, "pooled" their interests
into combined enterprises. Under this definition, no one "buys" anyone
else and, therefore, the accounting for the merger consists of simply joining
together the two sets of books. There is no recognition of a "purchase" and,
hence, no requirement to account for the market price which was actually
paid.
As noted, the fiction of a requirement for "comparable" size of pooled
companies rapidly disappeared, a victim of merger fever. Another funda-
mental problem of the ever-widening application of the pooling concept
was the inherent idea that since the "pooling" referred to the combining of
equity interests in companies, it was only applicable to mergers in which
the acquiring company gave its shares to the former shareholders of the
acquired company. This requirement became a problem because some
sellers had the quaint notion that they would like some cash along with the
shares they received. In other, perhaps less common circumstances, buyers
preferred to pay with cash, but wanted to avoid the subsequent use of the
purchase treatment. In conformity with the now-accepted idea that basic
merger accounting concepts could be modified to suit the aims of the parties
to the merger, several new techniques were developed.
When the Buyer Has Cash
There are times when an acquiring company would prefer to give cash,
rather than stock, when it merges with another company. We have previ-
ously explained that it is difficult to reduce the value of the cash given to
make it conform, in a pooling of interests, to the book value of a company
purchased. Nevertheless, with a will there is a way, and accountants have
devised it - use treasury stock.
During 1966, the Corporation [Westinghouse Electric] delivered 676,806
shares, (including 538,701 previously unissued) of its common stock in
exchange for the net assets and business of... [companies named]. These
transactions were treated as poolings of interests ....
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The amount of $4,531,000 shown in the consolidated Statement of
Retained Earnings represents the retained earnings of the pooled com-
panies . . . less the excess over par value of the allocated cost ($5,640,000)
of reacquired shares used in the poolings.8
In other words, Westinghouse purchased shares of its own stock for cash
and then utilized these shares to acquire another company, thus providing
the rationale for treating the merger as a pooling. The cost of the shares
given was apparently $6,503,000; $5,640,000 plus $863,000, representing
$6.25 par value per share. The market value of the shares given was some-
what higher: Westinghouse made an almost embarrassing profit in dealing
in its own stock. In its 1965 balance sheet, Westinghouse carried treasury
stock as an asset, "available for the Employee Stock Plan and other corpo-
rate purposes":
Westinghouse Electric Corporation common stock-
at cost (1965 market value $14,114,938) $9,939,928
If the habitual use of treasury stock in acquisitions (it was also done
in 1965) had a part in Westinghouse's dropping the archaic presentation of
treasury stock as an asset, and switching to the more conventional deduction
of the amount from total equity (as it was presented in 1966), then at least
this stretching of the pooling concept was not entirely without merit. This
use of treasury stock in a pooling, however, raises a whole series of issues
related to the nature of treasury stock. For practical purposes, however, it
permits an acquiring corporation to effectively pay cash while continuing
to use the pooling method. The difference between the book value of the
acquired company and the cost of the treasury stock, which would represent
goodwill if purchase accounting were followed, is effectively written off
against capital at the acquisition date, as previously described in the West-
inghouse explanatory note.
Give a Little Cash Or Sell a Little Stock
The original AICPA standards defining the circumstances which per-
mitted use of pooling accounting also called for continuity of ownership
after the merger was accomplished. The restriction that the acquisition be
totally for stock in order to qualify for a pooling is often relaxed, however,
to the extent of allowing up to 10 percent of the price to be paid in cash.
It has also become common practice to allow the "bought out" stockholders
to sell off a portion of the shares they have received, without affecting the
ability of the acquiring company to use the pooling treatment. At present,
however, the SEC frowns on selling off more than 25 percent of the shares
given. Effects on the market of the sales of large blocks of shares might also
limit the attraction of this alternative.
When neither of these alternatives satisfied the twin demands of sellers
8 WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORPORATION 1967 ANNUAL REPORT, at Note 2.
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who wanted cash and buyers who wanted the pooling of interest, something
new had to be devised. Once again, the victim was rational accounting, as
the quest for pooling spawned another embarrassing chapter in accounting
history.
The Part-Pooling, Part-Purchase
The acquisition of Paramount represented by the company's purchase
of approximately 16.77% of the outstanding Paramount stock in April,
June and September of 1966 for a total of $22,090,000 in cash will be
accounted for as a purchase, with the excess of the purchase price over
the book value of the shares acquired being allocated to television film
library . . . pending an evaluation of Paramount's assets. The acquisition
of approximately 1.85% of the outstanding Paramount stock in exchange
for [G&W Series B Preferred Stock] in June 1966 and acquisition of
the balance of the Paramount stock in exchange for [G&CW stock] as a
result of the merger will be accounted for as a pooling of interests.9
The popular part-pooling, part-purchase, described in this note from
the Gulf & Western Listing Application connected with acquisition of
Paramount Pictures, provides considerable flexibility in the arrangement
of merger terms, while still permitting most of the benefits of the pooling
treatment. The net assets of the acquired company are split into two parts
which are accounted for much like two separate acquisitions - one a pur-
chase, the other a pooling. In most cases, the cash of the acquired company
and other, often non-amortizable assets are considered to have been the
assets purchased. The remaining portion of the acquired company, 83.23
percent here, is treated as another acquisition on the pooling basis. The
portion paid for in cash is recorded at the purchase price, while the pooled
portion comes in at the book value it had under the acquired company.
Judicious allocation of appropriate assets to each portion can improve
subsequent net income. If the purchased portion is clearly denoted as assets
which are not subject to amortization or later charged to income, no harm
is done to future income and any goodwill can be ascribed to the pooled
portion of the transaction. In the Paramount case, the purchased assets
were specified as films held for television, which consisted of pictures already
exhibited in theaters, generally already amortized down to book amounts
far below current value. While the new cost basis created by the purchase
treatment will have to be charged to income when the films are sold, the
"purchase" of the films for cash appears to make this a taxable transaction,
assuring the deductibility of that cost when the films are sold or rented. Had
the cash payment gone for nondeductible "Goodwill," it would never be
recoverable for tax purposes.
Swingline Has Its Cake and Eats It
The exchange of 139,933 shares of Class "A" Stock of Swingline Inc.
for all the common stock of Wilson Jones Company held by persons other
9 Gulf & Western Listing Application to New York Stock Exchange, No. A-25737, Oct.
19, 1966, at 2.
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than Swingline Inc. will be accounted for by Swingline as a "pooling of
interests". The previous acquisition of 203,463 shares of Wilson Jones
Stock has been accounted for as a purchase. The excess of equity acquired
in Wilson Jones over the original cost thereof is to be credited to income
ratably over a period of ten years from the date of consolidation.10
Swingline obtained control of Wilson-Jones in 1959, through the acqui-
sition of about 58 percent of its stock. The book value of 58 percent of
Wilson-Jones exceeded the price paid by Swingline by $624,000. That is,
negative goodwill of $624,000 arose from the first transaction. Swingline ac-
counted for this transaction as a purchase, thus allowing for the recording
of the negative goodwill and its subsequent amortization as a tax-free credit
(increase) to income. In the second acquisition of about 41 percent of
Wilson-Jones, Swingline gave shares with a total market value of $4,664,000,
when the net book value of this interest in Wilson-Jones was approximately
$4,100,000. Had this transaction also been recorded as a purchase, it would
have given rise to $564,000 of goodwill, which would have almost completely
offset the previously created negative goodwill. But, Swingline exercised its
option, as it were, to treat the second acquisition as a pooling and no
goodwill was recorded. Thus, through the use of the part-pooling, part-
purchase technique, Swingline was able to increase income through the
amortization of the negative goodwill on the "purchased" portion of Wilson-
Jones, while it escaped the "penalty" of goodwill which would have arisen on
the later acquisition by using pooling accounting for that portion.
Is It Right or Wrong?
It takes no great perception to see that the part-pooling, part-purchase
does fundamental injustice to the underlying rationale for the pooling of
interests treatment. It is but another chapter in the continuing story of the
distortion of business combination accounting concepts to suit the purposes
of the parties to mergers, rather than to record circumstances which oc-
curred.
Iliwill Brings Profits
The preceding illustrations in this paper have dealt with the use of
the pooling-of-interest method to reduce charges to income following merg-
ers. However, the pooling method need not serve only the passive function
of reducing amortizable expenses; skillfully applied, in combination with
hybrid securities, it can result in an absolute increase in reported earnings.
Nor is the pooling method the only form of merger accounting which will
raise earnings. The purchase method, selected in the right circumstances,
can also raise the earnings of companies combined in a merger to a figure
higher than the total reported by the companies prior to the merger.
The acquisitions during 1963 of the common stock of [companies named]
10 Swingline Inc. Listing Application to New York Stock Exchange, No. A-20986, Mar.
29, 1963, at 1.
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. . . resulted in excess of equity in net assets of these subsidiaries over
cost of $2,727,819 and $9,925,386 respectively. The amounts in this
account are being amortized by credits to income over ten years, or in
such sufficient amount to offset any loss on sale of non-earning assets
received in the original acquisition, or proratably credited to income if
significant portions of a subsidiary's earning assets are sold. Two sub-
sidiaries of Marshall-Wells Company sold most of the originally acquired
installment accounts receivable without recourse in September 1963 at
a discount of $533,168, accordingly, an equivalent amount of the excess
of equity in these two subsidiaries over cost was credited to income. In
addition, amortization of $699,680 and $710,159 was credited to income
in the accounts of Marshall-Wells Company and Larchfield Corporation
and all subsidiaries, respectively."
The amounts of negative goodwill amortized in the above note are
particularly interesting when one finds that the 1963 income of Larchfield,
including the amortization credit of $710,000, was only $95,246. The amorti-
zation of the negative goodwill did not show as a separate item in the in-
come statement, although the statement contains a half dozen other smaller
items. It was clearly disclosed, however, in the above cited Note 12, among
13 other Notes which filled five pages of small print.
How Does Illwill Arise?
While "Goodwill" is the commonly accepted term to describe the
excess a company pays over the book value of another company it purchases,
no accepted term denotes the opposite case -when the purchase price is
less than the book value or the equity of the acquired company - although
negative goodwill is most widely used. In most statements, the item, found
somewhere near the equity section of the balance sheet, is mechanically
described as "Excess of equity in net assets of subsidiaries over cost."
Illwill, less common than goodwill, usually arises in the acquisition of
a loss company, when the book asset values are higher than the earnings
(or losses) justify, and hence exceed the purchase price. The purchased
company (poolings are rarely used in such cases) is recorded at its book
value, the purchase price at the actual figure, and the resulting credit tucked
away near the equity section of the balance sheet. The accounting principles
of the AICPA suggest that an attempt be made to determine which assets
are overstated, but the conclusion, from Larchfield's resulting negative
goodwill, is that the amount could not be attributed to specific assets. At
this point, the AICPA, in an almost total departure from the sanctified
historical cost rule, allows the assets to be carried at more than their pur-
chase price and permits the amortization of the credit as an increase in in-
come. Note too, that as with goodwill, the amortization of illwill is not a
taxable item. It raises after-tax net income dollar for dollar.
11 LARCHFIELD CORP. AND MARSHALL-WELLS Co. 1963 ANNUAL REPORT, at Note 12.
Marshall-Wells and Larchfield had substantial mutual ownership and therefore reported
together in a single annual report.
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While there is some possibility of rationalizing this pragmatic non-
accounting when it is truly impossible to attribute the illwill to specific
assets, one wonders why, as described in the Note, Larchfield found it pos-
sible to specify precisely the related assets when they were sold, but not when
they were acquired.
How To Evaluate Illwill?
It was demonstrated above how recognition and amortization of good-
will, under a purchase, reduces the profits of a merged enterprise to less than
the profits of the constituents prior to the merger. The reduction results
because a new amortizable debit balance is created which did not previously
exist. In the case of negative goodwill, a new amortizable credit balance is
created, which also did not previously exist. When it is amortized it results
in "earnings" which are higher than those which existed prior to the
merger.
Should the analyst merely disregard the illwill and look to the operating
earnings? Or, is it a legitimate item of profit? A simple answer is that
amortized negative goodwill can never represent "income." There is no way
to rationalize, in this cold world, that a "bargain purchase" - that is, a
purchase below book value -results from anything other than a bookkeep
ing error on the part of the acquired company. Just as goodwill results
principally from a failure to record existing intangible assets, negative
goodwill results from a failure to write down book values of assets to reflect
their actually lowered earning power. To view the amortization of this
bookkeeping error as a "profit" is clearly not logical.
However, in some circumstances amortized negative goodwill can be
viewed in terms of its origin, that is, as the correction of an error. If the
assets of the acquired company which are recorded at more than purchase
price are themselves being amortized to expense, through depreciation or
cost of goods sold, then the expenses of the company are overstated and
profits unduly reduced. In this case, the amortization of the negative good-
will serves as a crude bookkeeping device to even up the situation.
On the other hand, if the "excess" depreciation on the overstated assets
is less than the amortization of the negative goodwill, then the illwill clearly
represents profit inflation. Similarly, if the potential losses resulting from the
overvalued assets are realized quickly, as would be the case if inventory
were involved, then long-term amortization of the illwill represents a long-
term inflation of profits.
The only reasonable solution, given the accountants' failure to adjust
the asset values at the time of purchase, is to attempt the difficult and uncer-
tain task of ascertaining the source of the illwill. In recent years, the SEC
has occasionally raised objections to this type of accounting, and thus has
reduced the number of glaring examples; nevertheless, as noted below, some
rather absurd examples are still occurring.
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Hidden Treasures in Small Companies
Small, nonpublic companies usually maintain their accounting solely
for tax purposes. Since the goal in tax accounting is to minimize income,
most companies accounting on a tax basis sharply understate their income,
compared with the figures which would be presented in accordance with
"generally accepted accounting principles." The understatement is accom-
plished by providing generous allowances for bad debts, minimizing inven-
tory with LIFO (and sometimes through overlooking some of it), using
accelerated depreciation for book and tax purposes, charging personal ex.
penses to the corporation, etc. When such a company is merged into a
corporation that takes the trouble not only to minimize taxes but also to
utilize less conservative methods for book and reporting purposes (which is
permissible in virtually every area except the LIFO inventory method), net
income of the acquired company can be rather nicely raised, often without
sacrificing tax savings.
When such accounting changes are made "in order to bring the ac-
counting practices of the pooled company into conformity with those of the
parent," there is a "requirement" that the previous years' statements used
for comparison also be restated. However, as a practical matter, the informa-
tion necessary for such restatements is often impossible to obtain, and the
restatement of comparative figures is not performed. The failure to restate,
of course, provides for a more favorable comparison with the prior year.
How To Gain One Year's Growth With a Pooling
From Avnet, Inc. Annual Reports:
Per Share Income
As Reported In: 1967 1966 1965
June 30, 1966 Annual Report $1.58 $1.03
June 30, 1967 Annual Report $2.33 $1.87
During the year ended June 30, 1967 the company acquired the net assets
of [several companies named]. Subsequent to June 30, 1967, the company
acquired the net assets of Channel Master Corporation and the outstanding
stock of five affiliated corporations for 319,501 shares of $3 cumulative
convertible preferred stock plus a maximum 146,000 of such additional
shares contingent on future earnings. These acquisitions have been
accounted for as poolings of interests and accordingly the accompanying
statements of income reflect the operating results of these companies for
the entire fiscal year. The financial statements for the year ended June
30, 1966, which are included for comparative purposes, have been restated
to include the accounts of the pooled companies. 12
Avnet, with a fiscal year ending on June 30, 1967, agreed on July 11,
1967, to merge with Channel Master Corporation. The merger was accom-
plished by the exchange of a convertible preferred, plus a contingent is-
suance of about 50 percent more of the same convertible, for the assets of
12 AVNET, INC. 1967 ANNUAL REPORT, at Note 1.
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Channel Master. According to "generally accepted accounting principles,"
when a merger is treated as a pooling of interests, in any financial state-
ments presented, the two companies should be shown as if they had always
been merged.
Thus, in the normal case of a pooling anytime during a year, the earn-
ings of the pooled companies are combined for the entire year of the state-
ments. It is normal accounting practice, however, to reflect in financial
statements for a given period, certain "subsequent events." Generally, when
an event occurs after the year ends, but before the financial statements for
that year have actually been prepared, which had it been known by the
end of the year would have modified the statements at the time, the event
is retroactively reflected in the statements. Thus, if it is discovered after the
year ends that the inventory thought to be saleable at the end of the year
actually was not saleable, the year-end inventory would be retroactively
written down, if the financial statements had not yet been prepared,
Using the same logic, if a pooling occurs after the year ends, but before
the statements have been prepared, it is retroactively reflected in the finan-
cial statements for the previous year.
Thus, Avnet reflected the earnings of Channel Master in both years
presented in the 1967 Annual Report, even though the merger took place
subsequent to the end of the 1967 year. The net result of this "conformity"
with accounting theory is to report a year's growth about a year earlier.
Raising Per Share Earnings Through a Pooling
An interesting point about the Avnet figures is that the pooling pro-
duced a significant increase in per share earnings. It is logical to expect that
pooling with a profitable company will increase total earnings. However,
assuming that when stock is given to buy earnings, the earning rates of the
stock exchanged by both parties should be comparable to each other, per
share earnings of the joined or pooled enterprise should not be significantly
affected.
Note that Avnet gave convertible preferred, not common stock. The
total annual dividend requirement of the preferred actually given was
319,051 times $3.00 or about $960,000. The earnings of Channel Master in
1966 were about $1,990,000. Since no additional common shares became
actually outstanding,13 per share income benefited from the $1 million of
additional applicable income.
Fully diluted earnings were required to be shown in the 1967 Listing
Application 14 and, interestingly, they are $1.58 per share for 1966, precisely
the same figure originally presented in Avnet's 1966 Annual Report.'5 This
13 This was prior to the requirement that common stock equivalents be considered in
computations of primary earnings per share.
14 Avnet, Inc. Listing Application to New York Stock Exchange, No. A-25659, Feb. 5,
1968.
15 See note 12 supra and accompanying text.
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suggests some increased attention to the fully diluted figure when mergers
are consummated with convertibles.
The Ultimate Example: A Part-Pooling, Part-Purchase
of a Part of a Partnership
In preparing these discussions on merger accounting, a number of ex-
amples of interesting financial presentations were reviewed. The following
case is herewith presented as a candidate for the best job of completely
destroying any illusions anyone might still retain that there are any basic
principles in merger accounting.
In February 1968, Servomation Corporation filed a Listing Applica-
tion 16 describing the details of its merger with a part of the Kaset Mobile
Coffee Service, a partnership with 41 employees engaged in the "mobile
catering business" in Chattanooga, Tennessee. Servomation issued 15,300
shares of its stock (constituting 0.334 percent of the combined equity of the
merged enterprises) and gave $240,213 in cash in return for the merchandise
inventory and one-half of the net fixed assets of Kaset, all of which had a
net book value of $102,213. The partners of Kaset retained its cash, a park-
ing lot, a building, and $33,641 of other investments.
The Listing Application notes:
This acquisition will be treated as a partial pooling of interests-partial
purchase for accounting purposes. ... Servomation's independent public
accountants have reviewed and approved this treatment and found it to
be in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles.17
Adding it up, we have the merger of a large corporation with some mis-
cellaneous assets of a tiny partnership being treated as a partial pooling-
partial purchase. Was it really worth the trouble?
Why Such Chaos?
In recent years a good deal of criticism has been directed at the results
of current merger accounting. But, none of this gleeful pin pricking has dealt
with the causes of the problem.
Obviously, one problem is the apparently insatiable desire of some
American business enterprises to merge with other American business enter-
prises. If this description has vague sexual connotations, it is accurate at least
insofar as it implies the strength of the business impulses with which we are
dealing. Similarly, without stretching the analogy too far, the accounting
profession is, to some considerable extent, the guardian of public morals.
While accountants are not in a position to encourage or discourage mergers,
they do have a responsibility to see that accounting for mergers is performed
16 Servomation Corp. Listing Application to New York Stock Exchange, No. A-25389,
Feb. 1, 1968.
17 Id. at 1.
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in a reasonable manner. It is difficult to conclude that the profession has
been anything other than derelict in its duties in this respect.
A Dozen Years of Inaction
In almost every year of the 1960's the number of business combinations
has increased over that of the previous year. The diversity of the mergers -
in terms of differing sizes of enterprises, varying types of businesses and
forms which mergers have taken-has been staggering. A whole new type
of corporation has emerged. With this merger activity has come a vast
increase in the demands on merger accounting, both its theory and practice.
What has the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants done in
response? Until recently, virtually nothing.
In September 1950, the AICPA issued ARB No. 40, which briefly and
generally set forth the theoretical characteristics of the pooling and purchase
treatment. In January 1957, the Institute published ARB No. 48, which dis-
cussed the two treatments in somewhat more specific terms. By 1957 the
seductive appeal of the pooling treatment had become apparent and ARB
No. 48 was oriented more toward setting some limits on the use of the pool-
ing treatment. It, too, was written in general terms, except, unfortunately,
in the case of the size criterion, which was much too specific. Since then, for
more than 12 years, through the greatest burst of merger activity in Amer-
ican history, there has been no pronouncement from the AICPA on merger
accounting. Companies and their "independent" accountants have been left
virtually free to devise whatever methods and mechanisms served their pur-
poses. Only the SEC has served as a control, but it does not appear to
have been a match for the combined onslaught of managements and pro-
fessional accountants. Interestingly, while accountants generally remain
rather strongly independent of their clients, in merger cases they clearly
appear to have joined forces with the companies.
During 1969, the Accounting Principles Board (Board) of the AICPA
finally addressed itself to the problem of merger accounting. From the out-
set, it became apparent that deep disagreements within the Board, based on a
variety of factors, would delay the ultimate issuance of a definitive Opinion.
At the time of this writing (December 1969) the Board had indicated that it
would issue an exposure draft of a new Opinion. The draft appears to be
nothing more than a papering over the disagreements among its members,
providing for a limited use of the pooling of interest under supposed safe-
guards. The draft does not address itself to the' basic problem of merger
accounting, noted below.
THE REAL PROBLEM
The question can be raised as to whether there will ever be any solution
directly centered in mergers.
Consider the basic difficulties of the presently accepted methods of ac-
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counting for business combinations. Traditional purchase accounting with
the amortization of goodwill results, all other things being equal, in the
merged enterprise recording a lower profit than the total of the profits of
the previously uncombined units. This result has obviously, with possible
justification, been unacceptable to many managements. If the pooling treat-
ment is accorded to a merger, the comparison of profits is unaffected, but
only partial recognition is given to the amount of the investment that has
been made by the acquiring company. New managements are placed in con-
trol of assets which have essentially been bought and paid for, but for which
they are not held accountable. The possibility of concealing profit declines,
for example, becomes quite real.
A few other methods have been proposed for dealing with mergers. In
ARS No. 5 it was suggested that the assets of both companies in a merger be
revalued to some "fair" or "current" value at the time of the merger and
that these values be recorded.18 In most cases this would produce an even
lower profit than purchase accounting with amortization of goodwill. In
ARS No. 10, a one-sided polemic mislabelled a research study, the authors
suggested that goodwill be recognized at the time of a merger and then be
immediately charged off against capital. 19 This would produce the same re-
sult as the pooling, but in a less honest fashion. The new Board exposure
draft offers yet another variation.
The cataclysmic effect on profits of the "fair value" pooling concept
advocated in ARS No. 5 suggests the dimensions of the problem. Why
should the revaluation of both companies in a merger to current values or
the recognition of the market value of the acquired company through good-
will result in lower profits thereafter? There is only one possible reason: the
companies were valued on their books prior to the merger at less than their
real value. Under current accounting principles, companies do not record all
valuable assets, such as internally generated intangibles, and they often
understate others, such as fixed assets on accelerated depreciation or LIFO
inventories. The costs of using these unrecorded assets do not show as ex-
penses, and profits are thus overstated.
This situation produces no specific problem, until a merger occurs.
Then a comparison must be made between the unrealistic book values and
the very real market price being paid for them. This difference must be dis-
posed of one way or another in accounting for the merger. Merger account-
ing becomes burdened with all the past inaccuracies of the accounting system.
Under present accounting we either choose to ignore the differences which
are clearly seen to exist and use pooling, or we recognize them suddenly and
try to compensate for past overstatements by amortizing goodwill. Neither is
a particularly attractive solution. Recently, some companies, e.g., Litton
Industries, have chosen a third expedient: to record an acquisition as a pur-
18 Wyatt, supra note 1, at 81-86.
19 Catlett & Olson, supra note 2, at ch. 10, espedally 105-06.
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chase, without amortizing the resulting goodwill. This treatment, while
"acceptable" under a strict interpretation of existing accounting rules, does
some violence to the sensibilities of many accounting theorists. Nevertheless,
it does at least place all the assets which have been purchased on the finan-
cial statements, albeit in an amorphous blob called goodwill, which does
not disturb comparisons of profit before and after the merger. At best, this
is a weak attempt at a solution; it simply continues most of the inaccuracies.
Given the nature of the problem, it appears that the only feasible sol-
ution must be found outside the specifics of merger accounting, in a major
change in general accounting. Unless we dispense with the fiction of stylized
balance sheets prepared in accordance with so-called generally accepted ac-
counting principles, which bear no resemblance to reality, there will be no
solution to the merger problem. On the other hand, if balance sheets can be
brought into some reasonable relation to reality, merger accounting prob-
lems will virtually evaporate, just as problems of accounting for bond dis-
count and premium almost disappeared when bonds began to be issued at
coupon rates approximating going interest rates.
The Accounting Principles Board has given no indication that it intends
to view the solution to merger accounting in this broad context. Instead,
they are plainly returning to another compromise within the framework of
so-called generally accepted accounting principles. It is difficult to be op-
timistic that any such shortsighted solution will offer any significant change
from the present situation.
